We study the problem of identifying a single infection source in a network under the susceptible-infected-recovered-infected (SIRI) model. We describe the infection model via a state-space model, and utilizing a state propagation approach, we derive an algorithm known as the heterogeneous infection spreading source (HISS) es timator, to infer the infection source. The HISS estimator uses the observations of node states at a particular time, where the elapsed time from the start of the infection is unknown. It is able to incor porate side information (if any) of the observed states of a subset of nodes at different times, and of the prior probability of each infected or recovered node to be the infection source. Simulation results sug gest that the HISS estimator outperforms the dynamic message pass ing and Jordan center estimators over a wide range of infection and reinfection rates.
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INT RODU CTION
Consider an infection, which can be a computer virus, disease or rumor, spreading in a network of nodes. A node is said to be in infected state if it "possesses " that infection [1, 2] . For example, in the case of a rumor spreading in an online social network like Facebook, an infected node is a user who has posted the rumor on his social page in the recent past. A node is in susceptible state if it has never been infected before, or in recovered state if it has re covered from an infection. In the Facebook example, a recovered node corresponds to a user who has removed the rumor post or the post is not within a predefined number of most recent postings of the user. An infection follows a susceptible-infected (SI) model if a susceptible node may become infected if it has infected neigh bors, and an infected node stays infected [3] . The infection has a susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model if an infected node may recover from an infection but then stays uninfected forever [3] , and a susceptible-infected-recovered-infected (SIRI) model if a recovered node may again relapse into an infected state, i.e., it does not require any infected neighbors to reinfect it [4, 5] . In the Facebook example, a user may repost a rumor after he has removed it due to influences external to the Facebook network [6, 7] . The SIRI model reduces to an SI or SIR model if the probability of recovery or reinfection is equal to zero, respectively.
Suppose that after an unknown elapsed amount of time since the start of an infection spreading, we have a snapshot of the states of a subset of the network, and we want to identify the infection source based on this snapshot and the network topology. This is known as the network source identification problem, and has been extensively studied under the SI and SIR models. Various source estimators such as the distance (or rumor) center [1, 2, 8] , Jordan center [6, 9, 10] , dy namic message passing (DMP) estimator [11, 12] , belief propagation (BP ) estimator [12, 13] , have been proposed and studied. Each of these estimators seeks to find an approximate maximum likelihood, maximum a posteriori (MAP), or most likely infection path estima tor of the true infection source, and may require different levels of a priori information about the spreading process. For example, the distance and Jordan center estimators do not require any knowledge of the infection rates, which are utilized by DMP and BP estimators.
In this paper, we consider identifying a single infection source in a network under the SIRI model, which is more general than the SI and SIR models. The SIR I model is frequently used to describe the transmission of a contagious disease with relapse, such as bovine tuberculosis or human herpes virus, in which recovered individuals may revert back to the infectious class due to reactivation of the la tent infection or incomplete treatment [4, 5, 14] . The model is also used as a simplified version of general multi-strain models, where af ter an initial infection, immunity against one strain only gives partial immunity against a genetically close mutant strain [15] . A further example of SIRI type of infection spreading is rumor spreading in an online social network, as alluded to earlier in the Facebook ex ample. It is thus of both practical and theoretical interest to consider infection spreading and source identification in a network under the SIRI model. However, the problem is more challenging than the one under the SI and SIR models because a node may become infected and recovered multiple times. Therefore, it is unclear if the infection source estimators currently proposed in the literature can be applied directly to the SIR I model, and if this will lead to significant perfor mance deterioration.
In this paper, we aim to find an approximate MAP estimator for inferring the infection source under the SIRI model. Our estimator is derived as a non-trivial extension of the DMP estimator, which cannot be applied directly to the SIRI model because it violates the assumption of unidirectional state transitions [16] . Our estimator is also related to the revised version of DMP called DMP r in [13] , which is also applicable only to the SIR model. Furthermore, our new estimator is able to incorporate side information such as the prior probability of each candidate node being the infection source, and additional observations on subsets of nodes in periods other than the snapshot time. We call our new estimator the heterogeneous in fection spreading source (HISS) estimator for its applicability to a network with nodes following different (i.e., SI, SIR and SIRI) in fection models. Simulations are performed on random regular tree networks and a subset of Facebook network to evaluate the proposed estimator and compare its perfonnance with those of the Jordan cen ter estimator, and the DMP estimator. Our simulation results suggest that the HISS estimator outperforms both the Jordan center and DMP estimator over a wide range of infection and reinfection rates.
INFECTION MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we characterize the SIRI infection spreading using a state-space approach [17] . Throughout this paper, we assume a We also use 0: n to denote the integer set { O, 1, ... , n }.
Let the network over which the infection spreads be described by a directed graph, (N, E), where N � 1 : N is the node set and £ is the edge set. A directed edge (I, k) exists from node I to node k if node I can directly infect node k, in which case node l is said to be an in-neighbor of node k, and conversely node k is said to be an out-neighbor of node I. We denote the set of in-neighbors of a node k asNk.
Suppose that there is a single node s* in the network that starts the infection at time 0, and suppose that we observe the node states of a set of nodes in the network at a particular time Tf, which we call the snapshot time. We assume that Tj is unknown, and that time is taining different infection processes of SI, SIR and SIRI at different nodes. Our model thus subsumes those studied in [1, 2, 9, 13, 16] .
We assume that conditioned on the node states in time slot t -1, all node transitions in time slot t are independent of each other. We use pff(t), pf (t) and p/!(t) to denote the probabilities of a node kEN to be in states 5, I and R at time t, respectively.
Adopting a state-space modeling approach, we define these three probabilities as state variables. The infection model is then obtained by describing the evolution of the three state variables in time using difference equations. Using the state transitions for the SIRI model, we have for all tEl: Tf and kEN,
where Uk(t -1) is the event that no in-neighbor passes the infection to node k in during time t -1 to t, and 5k(t -1) is the event that node k is in state 5 at time t -1. By assuming that in-neighbors pass infection to a node independently, and utilizing the mean-field approximation, we have lP' (Uk(t -1) I 5k(t -1)) � II ( 1 -O!lkP/ ISkCt-l) (t -1)) , IEN k (4) where p/ ISk(t , ) (t2) � lP' ( I I(t2) I 5k(t l )) , for all t l ,t2 EO: Tj, which is the probability that node I is in state I at time t2 given that node k is in state 5 at time t l . (Note that equation (4) is exact if the graph (N, £) is acyclic.) To complete the model, we need to have an explicit expression for p/ ISkCt-l) (t -1).
To that end, we introduce two classes of auxiliary state variables.
For all tEO: Tf, l E Nk, kEN, let elk (t) be the the probability of a node I not infecting its out-neighbor k up to time t, given that node k is in state 5 at time t; and let 1Jlk(t) be the probability of a node I to be in state I at time t and not infecting its out-neighbor k up to time t, given that node k is in state 5 at time t. Then it can be shown that
and the auxiliary conditional probabilities are computed from jEN/\{ k } (5) (6)
Compared to the DMP equations in [11] , the new term at the end of (7) arises from the reinfection of a recovered node, which is unique to the SIRI infection model. This term is then computed by (9) , which further depends on the new equation (5) and equation (8) .
The key equation (5) follows from an important observation:
where the last equality follows from (1) and (4) . We note that for a directed acyclic graph, the above equations are exact, while we will treat these as approximations for general network graphs.
We proceed to associate virtual observation equations with the state dynamics. Let NP, N/ and N t R denote the sets of nodes observed to be in states 5, I and R at time t, respectively; and NPR denote the set of nodes observed to be in an uninfected state but are indistinguishable to be in state 5 or R at time t. We exclude all observed susceptible nodes whose in-neighbors are also observed to be susceptible, because these nodes do not con tribute to the infection realization [12] . We use N' to denote the full node set N with such uninformative nodes removed, and Nk to denote the neighbors of node k in the reduced graph for all k E N'.
Let Ne be the set of nodes that have been observed to be in states I, R, or SR at some observation time (i.e., the candidate sources).
Moreover, the prior probability of a candidate to be the infection source is denoted by pl o for all k E Ne. 
pl (0) = 0, Vk E N'\Ne, (14) P/:(O) = 0, Vk E N', (15) 8Ik(0) = 1, VI E Nk, k E N', (16) <plk(O) = pl (0), Vt E Nk, k E N', (17) L pl(O) = 1, where the infection model (1)-(10) is applied to a reduced graph which excludes the aforementioned observed uninformative suscep-tible nodes, and (12)-(17) specify the initial conditions of the infec tion model.
Note that the observation variables Yk(t) in the objective func tion are expressed by state variables Pk (t) via (10) , and that the basic state variables Pk(t) and the auxiliary state variables 8Ik(t) and <Plk(t), for all t 2: 0, I E Nk and kEN, are determined by the decision variables pl (0) for all k E Ne via (1)- (10) . There fore, the optimization essentially depends on the decision variables {pl (O)} kENc and Tf· We also note that Tf is larger than the elapsed time between the time when the first side information is ob served and the snapshot time.
Because of the nonlinearities involved in the infection model (1) (10), it is difficult to solve (PO) by a standard optimization solver. Nonetheless, it is straightforward to get a solution by enumerating and comparing all feasible solutions of (PO), Given a candidate source and a value of Tf, the algorithmic complexity of comput ing the objective function is O(dTfIN'I), where d is the average in-degree of the reduced graph. Since we need to enumerate all can didate values of Tf for all candidate sources, the overall algorithmic complexity is then O(dTfl.N'IINeI ITcl).
Our proposed inference process inherits the merit of the DMP method, but it is able to incorporate available side information (if any) and is applicable to a network consisting of nodes that follow heterogeneous (namely, SI, SIR and SIRI ) infection models, For this reason, we call this new estimator the HISS estimator for short.
Although the HISS estimator is derived by assuming that the in-neighbors pass infections to a node independently (cf. (4», we can still apply it heuristically to a network where this assumption is violated. We expect that the impact on the performance of the HISS estimator to be small if the network is sparse or has weak correlations between infections passed by neighboring nodes, We note that a similar argument was used to explain the success of well-known BP methods in general network [18] .
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION VIA SIMULATIONS
We apply the proposed HISS estimator to infer single infection sources in random regular tree networks and a subset of the Face book network under the SIRI model, and then compare the inference results with those obtained with the DMP and Jordan centre (JC) estimators, In applying the DMP estimator, we ignore the rein fection probability of a recovered node and hence naively treat the SIRI model as an SIR model. In the simulations, we assume that the snapshot time falls in the range [7 + 1, Tf + 7 -1], where Tf is the actual elapsed time and 7 is the elapsed time since the first side information is observed till the snapshot observation time. In simulations we set 7 to Tf /2 if Tf is even and (Tf -1) /2 if Tf is odd. We assume uniform infection, recovery and reinfection rates at all nodes in the network, To compare the estimators, we adopt the following two metrics, which are correlated to the likelihood of wrongly inferring the source and the absolute inference error in distance, respectively:
• Normalized rank of s* [11, 12] : We first rank the candi date sources in descending order according to the objective function value in (PO), The rank (2: 1) of the true infection source, subtracted by the ideal rank value of 1 (yielding the rank error), and then divided by the total number of candidate sources, gives in the desired normalized rank .
• Error distance of s to s* [19] : We compute the length of the shortest path from the source estimate s to the true source s*.
o.5r--.,------,------,-----,----:--, In the case of regular tree networks, in each instance, we ran domly generate a tree network of 1000 nodes with each node's de gree equal to 4 [11, 12] , and randomly choose an infection source. We then simulate the infection spreading until either 10 time slots or no less than 20% of the nodes are infected or recovered. We observe the states of all nodes at the last simulation time slot. To simulate the availability of different side information, we also col lect the states of a random selection of a given percentage (0%, 10% or 20%) of the nodes at time Tf -T. The inference results, av eraged over 1000 random instances, are shown in Fig. 2 . As the infection rate increases while the reinfection rate is fixed at 0.5, we observe that HISS outperforms DMP and JC for most infection rates W.r.t. both performance metrics. We also observe that incorporating additional observations (side information) always improves the per formance of HISS. However, this is not always true for DMP since the side information may mislead the inference process due to the spreading model mismatch. As the reinfection rate increases while the infection rate is fixed at 0.5, we observe that the advantage of HISS over DMP and JC becomes more obvious due to its use of a more general infection model in the inference. Again, incorporating additional observations improves the performance of HISS but may deteriorate that of DMP. The results also show that an estimator that is stronger in one performance metric may be weaker in the other performance metric, which is clear by comparing the performances of DMP and Je.
In the case of the Facebook network, we arbitrarily select a sub set of 500 nodes from the Facebook dataset used in [20] . In each simulation instance, we randomly specify an infection source and perform simulations under the same parameter settings as the regu lar trees. The results are shown in Fig. 3 . We observe that, in the absence of side information, HISS outperforms DMP W.r.t. both per formance metrics for most infection and reinfection rates. However, incorporating additional observations does not necessarily improve and may even deteriorate the performance of both HISS and DMP, in which case HISS may become inferior to DMP. This occurs because the Facebook network subset is found to be very loopy and contain many circular subsets, which tends to invalidate the mean-field as sumption embedded in the HISS and DMP estimators. all infection and reinfection rates, except when infection rates are high in which case JC has the smallest average error distance. Its corresponding average normalized rank of the true source however remains the largest among the three estimators.
CONCLUSION
We have introduced a state-space description of an SIRI infection model, and using the state propagation equations, we have derived an approximate MAP estimator for the infection source, given the observations of a set of node states at a snapshot time. Our proposed estimator is able to incorporate side information like observations of node states at intermediate times during the infection spreading and prior beliefs of potential candidate infection sources, into the inference procedure. Simulations on random regular tree networks and a subset of the Facebook network suggest that the HISS esti mator outperforms the Jordan center and DMP estimator for a wide range of the infection and reinfection rates. However, we note that in networks that are very loopy, adding side information may lead to a performance deterioration. Future work includes designing bet ter inference procedures that can handle side information better for loopy networks.
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